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CIVIL PROCEDURE-TRIAL PRACTICE-INTRODUCTION OF INADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE To CURE IMPROPER ARGUMENT BY COUNSEL-In a suit to recover
damages for wrongful death arising out of an automobile accident, plaintiff's counsel offered in evidence the official report of a police officer, which
included the officer's opinion that defendant's parked car had contributed
to the collision. Defendant's objection to this evidence was sustained on
the grounds that the report was hearsay and that it set forth a conclusion
which only the jury could draw. Defendant's counsel, during his summation, asserted that no police officer had said that defendant's car had
in any way caused the accident. The court, sua sponte, admitted into evidence the officer's report which had previously been excluded. On appeal
from a judgment for plaintiff, held, reversed and remanded for a new trial.
The trial judge abused his discretion by admitting previously excluded
evidence in order to cure a misleading argument by counsel in his summation. Harrington v. Sharff, 305 F.2d 333 (2d Cir. 1962).
Improper arguments by counsel are usually made in an attempt to
prejudice or mislead the jury by diverting its attention from evidence
which has been properly admitted at trial. 1 Illustratively, counsel may hope
to arouse the jury's sympathy or prejudice by emotional appeals to matters
of race, religion, or nationality; 2 he may misstate the evidence actually
presented in a manner favorable to his client's position; or he may at
tempt to add new evidence not previously introduced since inadmissible
or perhaps because there was no basis in fact for the assertion.3 Traditionally, a judge has had power to cure improper argument by objecting
sua sponte, by sustaining an objection to counsel's remarks, and by instructing the jury to disregard or to avoid being misled by the argument.4
However, these remedial measures may be inadequate when there is no
evidence in the record that is contrary to the incorrect or otherwise inadmissible statements made by counsel for the first time in his summation.
For instance, instructions to disregard the remarks may only call them to
the jury's attention, especially if the jury is not informed as to why it
1 Counsel is required to "confine his argument to the evidence in the case and to
the inferences to be drawn therefrom . . . ." Duchaine v. Ray, 110 VL 313, 321, 6 A.2d
28, 32 (1939). See Note, Improper Argument to Juries in Civil Cases, 43 MINN. L. REv.
545 (1959).
2 See Annot., 78 A.L.R. 1438 (1932). Cf. Annot., 32 A.L.R.2d 9 (1953).
3 Statements of counsel which are unwarranted by the evidence on record are considered improper. Fidelity &: Cas. Co. v. Niemann, 47 F.2d 1056, 1059 (8th Cir. 1931).
See 6 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1806 (3d ed. 1940).
4 See Viereck. v. United States, 318 U.S. 236, 248 (1942); Anderson v. Enfield, 244 Minn.
474, 481, 70 N.W.2d 409, 414 (1955) (instructions to jury); Brush v. Laurendine, 168 Miss.
7, 12, 150 So. 818, 819 (1933) (sustaining objection); Knight v. Willey, 120 Vt. 256, 264, 138
A.2d 596, 602 (1958) (sua sponte objection by court). In extreme cases of improper argument, a judge may also resort to such measures as rebuking counsel and granting a mistrial. See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 85 (1934) (granting a mistrial); Dixon v.
Business Men's Assur. Co. of America, 365 Mo. 580, 598, 285 S.W.2d 619, 632-33 (1955)
(reprimanding counsel).
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should disregard the remarks. 5 On the other hand, an instruction that a
statement is not supported by fact will probably lead the jury to assume
that the attorney's assertion is false. This assumption, if unjustified, could
be even more prejudicial to the offending counsel's case than his uncorrected statement would have been to the other party.
In circumstances where judicial instructions create the risk of confusing
the jury and arousing undue interest in a statement it should ignore, the
court may wish to consider the appropriateness of a possible alternative
remedy-bringing in previously excluded evidence to rebut counsel's remarks. Obviously, such evidence will not be available in all cases. However, in those instances where evidence is available, although ordinarily
inadmissible, which could mitigate the prejudicial effect of counsel's remarks, its introduction may be more effective than instructions by the
judge in preventing a jury from being misled by the improper remarks.
Certainly this will be true when the evidence presents sufficient facts for
the jury to understand why the remarks were improper.
The use of previously excluded evidence to cure improper argument
by counsel during summation may be supported by analogy to two wellestablished rules of evidence. First, evidence which is otherwise inadmissible
can be used for the purpose of impeaching the credibility of a witness. 6
Since counsel is thought to become a witness when he makes an assertion
as to which no evidence has been introduced,7 it would not seem inappropriate to permit the use of previously excluded evidence to impeach his
credibility when he is guilty of improper argument during his summation.
Perhaps a closer analogy can be drawn to a second evidentiary rule. A
trial judge has discretionary power, where counsel has introduced inadmissible evidence without objection, to permit his adversary to introduce
other inadmissible evidence concerning the same factual matter. 8 The
purpose of this "curative evidence" is to prevent the jury from being unfairly prejudiced or misled by the prior inadmissible evidence.9 For exII See 10 OKLA. L. R.Ev. 359 (1957), urging that a new trial be granted where prejudice
might have resulted from counsel's remarks, on the ground that curative instructions
to the jury are often ineffective. Cf. Kalven, Report on the Jury Project, in CONFERENCE
ON AIMS AND METHODS OF LEGAL R.EsEARCH 155 (1955). A study of experimental jury
verdicts indicated that when defendant disclosed that he had no insurance the mean
verdict award was $33,000; when it was disclosed that defendant had insurance but no
further mention of it was made by either the court or counsel the mean award was
$37,000; but where defendant had insurance and the court explicitly told the jury to
disregard it, the mean award increased to $46,000. Id. at 169.
6 E.g., Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 65 (1953), 35 ORE. L. R.Ev. 51 (1955).
7 Turpin v. Commonwealth, 140 Ky. 294, 298, 130 S.W. 1086, 1088 (1910). See 6
\V'IGMORE, op. cit. supra note 3, § 1806.
8 See, e.g., Crawford v. United States, 198 F.2d 976, 978 (D.C. Cir. 1952), 41 GEO.
L.J. 268 (1953); cf. Commonwealth v. Wakelin, 230 Mass. 567, 576, 120 N.E. 209, 213 (1918).
The majority rule permits use of otherwise inadmissible evidence to rebut prior in•
admissible evidence. Sec I W1c1110RE, op. cit. supra note 3, § 15; 35 MrcH. L. R.Ev. 636
(1937).
o Meyers v. United States, 147 F.2d 663, 667 (9th Cir. 1945). Wigmore suggests that,
if a party would be unfairly prejudiced, he should be entitled to the use of otherwise
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ample, if hearsay testimony of one version of a conversation has been admitted, the other party may introduce evidence of another version of the
conversation to prevent a distorted understanding of what was said.10
Counsel, by introducing inadmissible evidence, is said to have "opened
the door" to further consideration of the facts he presents. 11 Therefore,
he cannot object to the admission of curative evidence which may clarify
the actual situation for the jury. An attorney's remarks during his summation, which are not based on record evidence, are analogous to inadmissible hearsay testimony by a witness in that neither of the declarations
was made under oath or was subject to cross-examination.12 If counsel's
assertions are likely to mislead the jury, previously excluded evidence should
be introduced to avoid unfair advantage, just as it would have been admitted to cure the prejudicial effect of inadmissible evidence earlier in the
trial. Moreover, the availability of such a discretionary power in the trial
court would obviously discourage this type of improper argument.
Although the introduction of inadmissible evidence may frequently be
an effective remedy against improper argument, a judge should exercise
more restraint in admitting evidence on his own motion than when he
allows counsel to admit curative evidence during the trial. Evidence introduced during summation may overcompensate by prejudicing the offending counsel's client to a greater extent than the original misleading
assertion prejudiced his opponent. The evidence may be more damaging
than other curative evidence in that it is introduced too late in the trial
to be subject to the moderating influence of cross-examination. In addition, the jury may well give more weight to evidence introduced by the
judge than to curative evidence introduced by counsel. Therefore, this
remedial measure should be used only when the judge feels there is a substantial need for correction.
One of the primary purposes of all rules governing trial procedure is
to insure a just result through the reduction of trial by battle between
counsel. In keeping with this general goal, it should be the courts' duty
to see that improper argument does not give one party an unfair advantage
which can be prevented or corrected. In those instances where it appears
likely that the introduction of previously excluded evidence will prevent
a jury from being misled, without creating a new unfair advantage for the
other party, this will provide a better tool of judicial control than instructions which may only confuse the jury or inadequately eliminate the
advantage gained from the improper argument.18 The trial judge who
inadmissible curative evidence as a matter of right. Other rebutting evidence should
be admitted in the judge's discretion. 1 W1cMoRE, op. cit. supra note 3, § 15, at 309.
Carver v. United States, 164 U.S. 694, 697 (1896).
See, e.g., Thomas v. State, 121 Tenn. 83, 87, 113 S.W. 1041, 1042 (1908).
12 The hearsay rule seeks to insure that only assertions which have been tested for
trustworthiness by cross-examination should be considered by the jury. 5 WIGMORE,
op. cit. supra note 3, § 1362.
13 This is the view taken by Judge Clark in his dissent in the principal case at 339-40.
10
11
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hears the argument and observes its effect on the jury is in a preferred
position to determine which remedial measure, if any, should be invoked.14 It follows that appellate courts, which are unable to observe the
effects of counsel's summation, should be reluctant to decide that a judge's
decision to admit curative evidence at that stage of the trial constitutes
an abuse of discretion.111 Introduction of otherwise inadmissible evidence
as a curative measure should not be prohibited, but should be used sparingly, whenever the trial judge concludes that it is the most effective means
of reconciling competing demands of information for the jury and fairness
for all the parties.
Arthur M. Sherwood

See also his opinion in United States v. Appuzzo, 245 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1957): "A
trial judge must rule on admissibility quickly and almost by instinct; his instinct ought
to be to bring out the truth, rather than to permit a party to cover up a part of his
case." Id. at 421.
H See AnnoL, S2 A.L.R.2d 9, 56 (195S).
111 See Dura Seal Prods. Co. v. Carver, 181 Pa. Super. S77, SSl-82, 124 A.2d 4S8, 440
(1956).

